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In the last years activation strategies intended to get unemployed individuals back to
employment have become increasingly important. Besides active labour market policies
(ALMP), activation strategies include regular reporting and con￿rmation of unemployment
status, monitoring of the job-search e￿orts and/or action plans (Tergeist/Grubb, 2006).
Unemployment insurance (UI) bene￿ts usually depend on several eligibility criteria, i.e. UI
bene￿t recipients have to comply with certain rules in order to be eligible for UI bene￿ts1.
In this context, punitive sanctions have received increasingly more attention. UI bene￿t
sanctions in the form of bene￿t reductions are intended to set an incentive for UI recipients
to reenter work.
Studies on punitive sanctions usually distinguish between an ex ante e￿ect of a sanction
and an ex post e￿ect. If the mere possibility of being sanctioned raises the search e￿orts
of UI recipients ex ante, this is called the ex ante e￿ect, while the e￿ect arising from the
actual imposition of a sanction is called the ex post e￿ect. According to job search theory,
at the moment of the imposition of a sanction an individual will search for a job more
intensely and lower his/her reservation wage, which ￿nally will raise the transition rate
into employment. In this paper we focus on the ex post e￿ect of UI sanctions in Germany
for a random sample of persons who entered UI receipt from April 2000 until March 2001
in West Germany2. Our main question is whether the imposition of a UI sanction due to
refusing a placement proposition3 or an ALMP training sets an incentive to reenter work.
The key outcome variable is the employment probability after a sanction has been imposed.
As we do not have experimental data, where treatment is implemented randomly we have
to be aware of a potential selection bias due to endogeneity of treatment. We respond to
this problem by using a control group that is built by matching algorithms. We apply a
propensity score matching approach that takes timing of events into account by dividing the
sample into three di￿erent strata of individual unemployment durations. The treatment
group consists of those UI recipients who were sanctioned during the stratum considered
(and not before), while the controls are the ones who have not been sanctioned during the
stratum considered (and neither before) and who are still in UI receipt at the start of the
week of the sanction. Using informative data of the federal employment agency (FEA)
we rely on the assumption of conditional independence and present the identi￿cation and
the estimation of the ex post e￿ect of UI sanctions. As a robustness check, we apply a
di￿erence-in-di￿erences matching estimator.
1The term unemployment insurance bene￿ts is used for the German term "Arbeitslosengeld I".
2Since during the observation period the sanction rates in East Germany were about half of those in West
Germany this analysis is restricted to West Germany.
3A placement proposition is a job vacancy that the caseworker proposes to the UI recipient.
22 Literature review
There are several studies about the e￿ects of punitive sanctions (e.g. Fredriksson/Holmlund
(2003); Jensen/Rosholm/Svarer (2003); Boone/Sadrieh/van Ours (2004)). In general, re-
sults of most of these studies show that punitive sanctions have a positive impact on the
transition from unemployment to employment. In a theoretical contribution
Fredriksson/Holmlund (2003) analyse time limits of UI payment duration, monitoring in
combination with sanctions and workfare as three crucial features of UI policies. Their
simulations show that in a system with monitoring and sanctions, search incentives are
set most e￿ectively. Jensen/Rosholm/Svarer (2003) analyse the e￿ects of a youth unem-
ployment program (YUP) on the transition rates from unemployment to schooling and
employment using quasi-experimental data. They focus on three di￿erent e￿ects within
this program: an announcement e￿ect, a direct programme e￿ect, and a sanction e￿ect.
While they did not ￿nd evidence for an e￿ect of mere announcement of the YUP in form of
a letter, according to their research results the program itself and also (somewhat weaker)
sanctions have a positive e￿ect on the transition rate out of unemployment among young
Danish unemployed. Boone/Sadrieh/van Ours (2004) use data of an experiment among
62 students in order to investigate ex ante and ex post e￿ects of unemployment ben-
e￿t sanctions and ￿nd evidence for both. Their results suggest that the e￿ect of the
possibility of being sanctioned (ex ante e￿ect) is stronger than the e￿ect of the actual
imposition of a sanction (ex post e￿ect). These articles investigate the ex post e￿ects of
sanctions either with experimental data or they do not investigate the ex post e￿ect ex-
plicitly or only for a subgroup of young unemployed (Jensen/Rosholm/Svarer, 2003). In
contrast, the following studies identify the ex post e￿ect with non-experimental data using
survival analysis: Abbring/van den Berg/van Ours (2005), Lalive/van Ours/Zweim￿ller
(2005), van den Berg/Klaauw/van Ours (2004), Svarer (2007) and M￿ller/Steiner (2008).
Abbring/van den Berg/van Ours (2005) use administrative data of persons who entered
unemployment in 1992 and analyse the ex post e￿ects of UI sanctions in the Netherlands.
The sanctions they analyse range from a 5% bene￿t reduction for four weeks up to a
30% bene￿t reduction for 13 weeks. Their results indicate that punitive sanctions signif-
icantly raise individual transition rates into employment of UI recipients. The increase
of the transition rates they found ranges from 36% for males in the banking sector to
98% for females in the metal industry sector. By using administrative data of Switzer-
land Lalive/van Ours/Zweim￿ller (2005) are able to analyse the e￿ects of sanctions more
precisely as they were able to distinguish between the ex ante and the ex post e￿ect ex-
plicitly. The UI sanction they analyse is a 100% bene￿t reduction ranging from 14 to 60
days. Their results on the ex post e￿ect indicate that unemployment duration decreases
by about three weeks due to the announcement and the actual imposition of the UI sanc-
tion. According to their results, these e￿ects can be separated from each other: the exit
rate from unemployment increases by 28% after a warning has been imposed, whereas
3the actual imposition of a sanction additionally increases the exit rate by 23%.4 While
the analysis of Abbring/van den Berg/van Ours (2005) and Lalive/van Ours/Zweim￿ller
(2005) focus on the group of UI bene￿t recipients, van den Berg/Klaauw/van Ours (2004)
investigate ex post e￿ects of punitive sanctions on welfare recipients. Using administrative
data from Rotterdam they ￿nd an increase of the transition rate from welfare to work after
a sanction was imposed. According to their results, the hazard to leave unemployment
is about twice as large as before. Svarer (2007) investigates the e￿ects of sanctions on
the exit rate from unemployment in a sample of Danish unemployed and ￿nds empirical
evidence for ex post as well as ex ante e￿ects. According to his results the exit rate is
increased by more than 50% after the imposition of a sanction. Finally, M￿ller/Steiner
(2008) analyse ex post e￿ects of sanctions on UI as well as unemployment assistance (UA)
recipients in Germany. They ￿nd positive short- and long-term e￿ects of bene￿t sanctions
on the transition from unemployment to employment. In sum, the studies we found on
the ex post e￿ect of sanctions used survival analysis and found positive incentive e￿ects of
sanctions.
Additionally two studies on the determinants of being sanctioned were found:
M￿ller/Oschmiansky (2006) focus on a model of the determinants of regional sanction
rates in Germany.5 Their ￿ndings suggest that there are di￿erent levels of determinants
of a sanction, i.e. a sanction is not only determined by the individual’s behaviour itself.
According to results of M￿ller (2007) who analysed the determinants of being sanctioned
at the individual level, the age, the level of disability and the quali￿cation, but also the
local sanction policy a￿ect the individual sanction risk.
3 Unemployment bene￿t sanctions in Germany
During our observation period6, UI bene￿ts were paid if a person had been employed in a
job subject to social contribution for at least 12 months within the seven years previous to
unemployment. It depended on the duration of the previous employment period and the
age for how many months unemployment insurance was paid. The maximum duration of
UI bene￿ts receipt was 32 months for people who were older than 56 years old and who had
been employed for at least 64 months in the seven year previous to unemployment.7 Until
2005 a UI bene￿t recipient received means-tested unemployment assistance (UA) after his
claims to UI bene￿ts terminated. Table 1 gives an overview of the entitlement lengths of
4According to their results on the ex ante e￿ect a one standard deviation increase in the strictness of the
sanction policy will reduce individual unemployment duration by one week.
5M￿ller/Oschmiansky (2006) de￿ne the sanction rate as the ratio between the sum of e￿ective sanctions
imposed in a local employment agency due to refusal of a placement proposition or of an ALMP
measure, and the stock of bene￿t (UI, unemployment assistance (UA), integration aid) recipients of
the respective local employment agency.
6We use an in￿ow sample into UI bene￿ts between April 2000 and March 2001.
7In 2006 changes of Social Code (SC) III have decreased UI entitlement lengths for various age groups,
e.g. possible duration of UI bene￿ts receipt was limited to 18 months for persons older than 54.
4UI bene￿ts during our observation period.
Table 1: UI entitlement length in 2000/2001
age in years employment in months during
7 years previous to UI receipt
(SC III, ￿124, ￿127)






¸ 45 30 14
¸ 45 36 18
¸ 47 44 22
¸ 52 52 26
¸ 57 64 32
Source: Social Code (SC) III - Employment Promotion. 4th edition (February 15 2001).
Text edition, Nuremberg (Federal Employment Agency).
The monthly bene￿t amount received was 67% of the previous monthly net wage for
unemployed persons with children and 60% for those without a dependent child.8 The
time period of employment relevant for the calculation of the monthly UI bene￿ts amount
was 12 months.
In the years 2000 and 2001 there were neither changes in the sanction legislation nor in
the labour market policy a￿ecting sanctions (Karasch, 2005). An unemployment bene￿t
recipient was sanctioned if he did not comply with certain rules. In case of both,
short-term and long-term sanctions, UI or UA bene￿ts stopped completely for a certain
period. In general there were ￿ve sanction reasons: (1) If a person had voluntarily quit
his job, the entitlement time for UI bene￿ts was shortened by 25% or at least twelve
weeks, i.e. the person did not receive UI bene￿ts at all at least for the ￿rst twelve weeks
of unemployment. In case of hardship the sanction could be limited to six weeks and if
the job would have ended within four weeks anyway, the person was sanctioned by three
weeks only. (2) If he refused work, in the sense that he refused to apply for a reasonable
job that was proposed to him (placement proposition) or that he refused a reasonable job
that was o￿ered to him, a person was sanctioned by twelve weeks and three weeks
respectively if the job would have been temporary only. (3) Refusing or (4) dropping out
of an ALMP measure caused a sanction of twelve weeks and six weeks, respectively, if the
measure was intended to be less than six weeks. Finally, if an unemployed person failed
to report to the local employment agency or to a medical or psychological appointment
(5), the UI bene￿ts stopped for two weeks. The di￿erent types of sanctions according to
the SC III valid in 2000/2001 are summarized in Table 2. If the cumulated duration of
sanctions adds up to 24 weeks, a UI recipient lost the claim to UI bene￿ts ("sanctions
account regulation").
8The replacement ratio for UA was 57% and 53% respectively.
5Table 2: Sanction legislation in 2000/2001
Type Duration Notes Reduction
(1) Voluntary quit At least 1/4 of UI duration
(¸ twelve weeks)
6 weeks in case of hard-ship, 3
weeks if the job had ended any-
way within 4 weeks
100%
(2) Refusal of work twelve weeks 3 weeks if a temporary (<6
weeks) job was refused
100%
(3) Refusal of ALMP mea-
sure
twelve weeks 3 weeks if integration measure
< 6 weeks
100%
(4) Drop out ALMP mea-
sure
twelve weeks 3 weeks if integration measure
< 6 weeks
100%
(5) Failure to report to
job center or to medical /
psychological appointment
(S￿umniszeit)
2 weeks 2. failure: 4 weeks 100%
Source: Social Code (SC) III - Employment Promotion. 4th edition (February 15 2001). Text edition,
Nuremberg (Federal Employment Agency).
Sanctions are not implemented automatically, but at the discretion of the local em-
ployment agency and even the caseworkers. Empirically, sanctions are implemented quite
heterogeneously between local employment agencies (M￿ller/Oschmiansky, 2006) and even
within one local employment agency we assume the probability of one person to be sanc-
tioned to be in￿uenced by the assigned caseworker.
From 1996 until 2003, the yearly sanction rates in West Germany, calculated as total
number of sanctions divided by the stock of UI and UA recipients, ranged between 9.7% in
1997 and 13.6% in 2001, while in East Germany in general the sanction rates were lower:
they ranged between 4.1% in 1997 and about 6% in 1999 and 2003. Sanction rates di￿er
by the type of sanctions. Most sanctions are implemented due to voluntary quits: 75.7%
in 2000 and 75% in 2001. The following table reports the numbers of sanctions by type for
West Germany from 1996 until 2003:











1996 205744 88,4 5,8 3 2,8
1997 214021 85,1 8,2 3,6 3,1
1998 241076 80,7 10,8 4,1 4,4
1999 255095 78,6 11,9 4,3 5,2
2000 237228 75,7 15,4 4,3 4,6
2001 244851 75 17,7 3,3 3,9
2002 252592 73,2 18,7 4 4,1
2003 331141 58 34 4,4 3,7
Source: Labour Market 2003; O￿cial Announcements of the Federal Employment Agency 52. Special
Edition, July 15 2004, Nuremberg. *Note: Short-term sanctions due to not showing up at the job center are
missing as there are no o￿cial statistics on this sanction type until 2005.
The abrupt jump of the share of sanctions due to refusal of work in 2003 is most probably
caused by an internal circular of the employment agency (Rundbrief 55/03) in which the
local employment agencies and the caseworkers were called on to activate unemployed
6persons more e￿ectively. We will use this observation to support the idea of exogenous
variation in the individual sanction probability.
According to job search theory those sanctions are of interest in relation to the ex post
e￿ectiveness that are imposed during open unemployment. Thus we do not analyse the
e￿ects of sanction types (1) and (4). As short-term sanctions due to not showing up at
the agency (5) are assumed to be very di￿erent to long-term sanctions regarding their
implementation, they are analysed separately. In the empirical analysis below we focus on
the e￿ects of sanctions due to refusal of placement propositions (2) or an ALMP measure
(3).
4 Job-search-theory with sanctions
The theoretical framework is a job search model with sanctions introduced by
Abbring/van den Berg/van Ours (1996; 2005), the latter referred to as ABO05. Before we
derive a hypothesis on the sanction e￿ect, it is useful to present some general thoughts about
a UI system with sanctions. A basic job search model with endogenous search intensity is
presented e.g. by Mortensen (1986). ABO05 extend this model by introducing sanctions.
Following ABO05, we consider a situation where an individual has become unemployed
and currently is searching for a job. We take di￿erent parameters into account that are
assumed to in￿uence the job search process. First, UI recipients receive a certain ￿ow of
unemployment bene￿ts b. We assume that besides the pecuniary value of the UI bene￿ts,
there is a non-pecuniary utility of being unemployed which is also included in b. Second,
we assume that every UI recipient searches with a particular search intensity s. The level
of s is chosen by the individual himself. Third, the rate at which job o￿ers arrive is de￿ned
as ¸(s), where ¸(s) is increasing in s, i.e. the more intensely a UI recipient will search for a
job, the more likely he will be o￿ered a job. The wage that is o￿ered is randomly drawn out
of a wage o￿er distribution F(w). If a job is o￿ered the UI recipient has to decide whether
to accept the job given the wage o￿ered or to search further. Fourth, the search costs c(s)
increase in s, i.e. the more intensely he searches for a job, the higher the search costs. As
our model is based in a world with rational actors, we assume that every UI recipient aims
to maximize his expected present value of income over an in￿nite horizon of time. Finally,
it is the reservation wage Á together with the search intensity s that de￿nes the optimal
strategy of a UI recipient. Following ABO05 we introduce sanctions in this model. We
denote the bene￿t level a UI recipient receives before a sanction is imposed by b1. The
level of reduction when a sanction is imposed is denoted by r, thus we have b2 = (1-r)b1
being the bene￿t level a UI recipient receives after a sanction is imposed. We distinguish
two di￿erent aspects of sanctions: the institutional aspect meaning the individual acts in
a world where he might be sanctioned (ex ante) and the aspect of the actual imposition of
a sanction (ex post). We consider a UI recipient in a system with sanctions. At ￿rst sight
7one might assume that every UI recipient tries to avoid sanctions. If this was the case and
it was possible to avoid sanctions we would not observe sanctions at all. At second sight
we might think that UI recipients can perfectly anticipate when a sanction is imposed and
de￿ne their choices accordingly. This is disproved by ABO05 empirically.
A major assumption of their model is that individuals cannot foresee when exactly
a sanction is imposed, which corresponds to the so called no-anticipation assumption.
ABO05 base this assumption on the observation of regional di￿erences in the strictness
with which sanctions are applied. M￿ller (2007) presents very similar ￿ndings for Germany:
the transition into a sanction is not only in￿uenced by individual characteristics but also
by the strictness of the local employment agency.
Yet we assume, unemployed individuals do know the relationship between their behaviour
and the probability of being sanctioned. If the job search intensity exceeds a certain
threshold s¤ we assume that the probability of being sanctioned is zero. The rate at which
a sanction might arrive, i.e. the probability of being sanctioned given no sanction has yet





p0 > 0 if s < s¤
0 if s ¸ s¤:
(1)
According to equation (1), the more intensely a person searches for a job the lower is the
probability of being sanctioned. We assume that the punitive e￿ect of being sanctioned
is so severe that the person immediately after the imposition of a sanction will raise his
search intensity to a level beyond s¤ (s ¸ s¤).9 In order to identify the optimal strategy of
an unemployed individual we assume Ri to be the expected present value of income, Ái to
be the reservation wage and si the search intensity with i = 1;2 where i = 1 relates to the
time period before the imposition of a sanction and i = 2 relates to the time period after
the imposition of a sanction, respectively. Now we use the Bellman equation to express




































with ½R1 =Á1 (reservation wage before the imposition of a sanction) and ½R2 =Á2 (reser-
9The model requires some more assumptions (ABO05): ¸(s)= ¸0s and c(s)=1
2 c0 s2. Upon imposition
of a sanction, b is permanently reduced from b1 (bene￿ts level before a sanction is imposed) to b2
(bene￿ts level after a sanction is imposed). b1, F, ¸0, c0, p0, s¤ and the discount rate ½ are constant.
An implication of these assumptions is that the optimal strategy the individual chooses is constant
within the time interval before a sanction and within the time interval after a sanction. p0, ¸0 and c0
are exogenous parameters.
8vation wage after the imposition of a sanction). I(s1 < s¤) denotes the indicator function
being one if the search intensity is below the threshold level s¤ and being zero otherwise,
i.e. if the probability of being sanctioned is zero. We interpret the right hand side of the
equations (2) and (3) as the expected ￿ow of income given the search strategy. In equation
(2) this expected ￿ow consists of the following parts:
￿ the utility of unemployment (bw ￿ 1
2 c0s2
1),
￿ expected additional income when a job is found (the job o￿er arrival rate times the
expected gain of ￿nding a job compared to staying unemployed),
￿ the expected income drop when a sanction is imposed (I(s1 < s¤)p0 (R2-R1)).
The transition rate from unemployment to employment is assumed to depend on the o￿er
arrival rate ¸0, the search intensity si, and the distribution of the reservation wage ¹ F(Ái).
It is given by:
µu;1 = ¸0s1 ¹ F(Á1) (4)
µu;2 = ¸0s2 ¹ F(Á2); (5)
with ¹ F = 1 ¡ F.
Regarding the transition rate out of unemployment into employment, this model allows
to derive the hypothesis that at the moment at which a sanction is imposed the transition
rate from unemployment to employment jumps upwards. This hypothesis is based on the
following relations: the expected present value of income after a sanction is lower than
expected present value of income before the imposition of a sanction (R2 < R1), because a
sanction reduces the ￿ow of bene￿ts ((1-r) b1 < b1) and the choice of search intensity after
a sanction is restricted by s2 ¸ s¤. The fact that R2 < R1 implies that the reservation wage
falls at the moment of the imposition of a sanction (Á2 < Á1), so ¹ F(Á2)> ¹ F(Á1). s2 = s¤
also holds, while s1 < s¤ because otherwise a sanction could not have been imposed. This
implies that s2 > s1. In sum, we expect the transition rate to jump upwards in the moment
when a sanction is imposed (µu;2 > µu;1). Regarding the probability of being employed after
a UI sanction we derive the following hypothesis:
A UI sanction raises the probability of being employed after it has been im-
posed.
Though it is not focus of the empirical analysis of this paper, the model allows to derive
further mechanisms, e.g. by changing r or p0: The relation between the level of reduction
r and the search intensities s1 and s2 can be derived from equations (2) and (3): the higher
the reduction r the higher will be the expected negative income change, which will raise
s1 ex ante. An increase in r will also lead to an increase of s2 as the gain of ￿nding a job
will increase due to the decrease in the utility of staying unemployed. Whether a rise in p0
has a positive or a negative e￿ect on the search intensity, depends on whether a sanction
9has been imposed yet or not. Boone/van Ours (2000) show that the (ex ante) e￿ect on s1
is positive, while the (ex post) e￿ect on the di￿erence between s1 and s2 e￿ect is negative.
Thus if p0 is increased due to an increased monitoring, the ex post e￿ect will decrease.
5 Identi￿cation strategy
As we do not have experimental data, where treatment is implemented randomly and thus
can be treated as exogenous, we have to control for non-random assignment to treatment,
i.e. for the natural selection process. Factors that in￿uence assignment to treatment partly
in￿uence the outcome of interest. Therefore treatment and control group would receive
di￿erent outcomes anyway, even without treatment. We choose our evaluation approach
taking the endogeneity of treatment into account.10
As we want to evaluate the ex post e￿ect of UI sanctions on the reemployment probability
of a sanctioned person, we have to face the fundamental evaluation problem: we want to
compare the outcome of a sanctioned person i (Y 1
i ) with the outcome of the same person
i in the situation without having been sanctioned (Y 0
i ) at the same point in time (the so
called counterfactual outcome). Accordingly, the individual causal e￿ect is the di￿erence
between these two outcomes: ¢i=Y 1
i ￿ Y 0
i . We can either observe one state or the other,
i.e. the individual outcome we can observe is: Yi = Y 1
i ¢ Di + Y 0
i ¢ (1 ￿Di) with Di ² {0,1}.
The evaluation problem refers to the fact that we cannot observe the individual causal
e￿ect. Our approach to tackle the evaluation problem is to estimate the average treatment





0jX;D = 1) = E(Y
1jX;D = 1) ¡ E(Y
0jX;D = 1); (6)
where the average outcome of the treated in the state of being untreated, E(Y 0jX;D =
1), is not observable. What we do observe though is the outcome of the untreated:
E(Y 0jX;D = 0).
5.1 Static matching approach
The method of matching can be applied to estimate the ATT if the data is su￿ciently
rich. Since out data meet this requirement, we chose this method. Matching is based on
the assumption, that conditional on the observables X that are not a￿ected by treatment
and known by the researcher, Y0 is independent of treatment assignment, i.e.:
Y0 k DjX.11 (A.1)
10For an early discussion of the consequences of self selection see Heckman (1979).
11The stronger version of this assumption is (Y0;Y1) k DjX (Heckman et al., 1998). As we concentrate on
the ATT, i.e. we concentrate on the e￿ect of a sanction on behaviour of the sanctioned persons and
not on the e￿ects of a lack of a sanction on the behaviour of the non-sanctioned persons, the use of
10If assumption (A.1) holds, then E(Y 0jX;D = 1) = E(Y 0jX;D = 0), which implies that se-
lection bias does not occur as we have found an appropriate substitute for our unobservable
outcome (E(Y 0jX;D = 1)). In other words we have to ￿nd a "statistical twin" regarding
all variables of X. This intention is quite data demanding as the more dimensions X has
the more individuals would be needed to satisfy this assumption.
Rosenbaum/Rubin (1983) propose a matching method where individuals are not matched
conditional on X but on their conditional probability, to be assigned to treatment given
X, which they call the propensity score: P(X) = Pr(D = 1jX). They show that if (A.1)
is satis￿ed, then
Y0 k DjP(X), (A.2)
provided the probability of the non-treated to receive treatment is positive (0 < P(X) < 1).
An implication of (A.2) is that
E(Y
0jP(X);D = 1) = E(Y
0jP(X);D = 0); (7)
so that our results are not biased even when conditioning on the propensity score. Thus
when (A.2), also known as conditional independence assumption (CIA) holds, we can
identify the ATT.12 In order to ful￿ll (A.2), we need to control for all factors that a￿ect
both, the probability of a sanction and the probability to get back into employment.
5.2 Dynamic matching approach
As we are interested in the ex post e￿ect of a sanction after the sanction has been imposed,
we are confronted with a missing data problem not only for the term E(Y 0jX;D = 1) but
also for the point in time when treatment is not implemented for untreated people. In our
case treatment may start at any time the person receives UI bene￿ts. In order to account for
a potential selectivity bias due to time-constant unobserved heterogeneity Abbring/Berg
(2003) suggest a mixed proportional hazard model, the timing of events model, where
the duration until treatment and the duration of unemployment are modelled jointly (for
an application see e.g. Abbring/van den Berg/van Ours (2005)). Applying the timing of
events approach one has to be careful at specifying the model: according to the ￿ndings in
Gaure/Roed/Zhang (2007), imposing unjusti￿ed restrictions on the heterogeneity distri-
bution can cause substantial bias. Moreover, the proportional hazard speci￿cation already
imposes functional form restrictions in the outcome equation, that could bias parameter
estimates. Such functional form restrictions are not imposed by propensity score matching.
Y0 k DjX is su￿cient.
12Additionally the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTV A) has to hold: potential outcomes
and potential treatment status of each individual are independent of potential outcomes and potential
treatment status of all other individuals. As treatment in our case is a seldom event as we will see in
chapter 7.1 this assumption is plausible to hold. At the same time we assume the ex ante e￿ect to be
very low.
11We do not apply the timing of events approach here, but regard it as an alternative to the
matching approach.
In this subsection we address the question how we deal with the missing start date of
treatment for the untreated. There are di￿erent approaches to solve the problem of missing
start dates applying matching estimators.13 Fredriksson/Johansson (2004) point out the
importance of the dynamic process of treatment assignment. According to their results
using a time window de￿ned by the treatment information observed in the data at hand
in order to de￿ne who is treated and who is not treated is problematic: an estimator with
a binary treatment indicator that is based on such a time window is always biased as it
conditions on the future.
In this article we follow Sianesi (2004) and Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2007) and use an
evaluation approach that takes timing of treatment into account. We estimate the e￿ect of
being sanctioned in stratum u, de￿ned as a short time interval during the UI spell, on the
outcome variable, the labour market status in di￿erent months t after the stratum u, Yt
(with t > u). Each stratum u consists of a two month period counting from the individual
start of UI receipt. The treatment indicator of stratum u is denoted by D(u) = 1 for individ-
uals being sanctioned in stratum u and D(u) = 0 for those neither having been sanctioned
before stratum u nor being sanctioned within stratum u. Thus we distinguish between
di￿erent treatment periods: the three strata u. By applying this approach, treatment and
outcome decisions of the past are taken into account, i.e. the approach controls for the
dynamic sorting process of treated and controls into the group of being at risk of being
sanctioned.14 Using the matching approach in such a strati￿ed manner one allows for an
interaction of the treatment e￿ects with the dynamic sorting process and for heterogenous
treatment among the di￿erent strata considered (Fitzenberger/Speckesser, 2007).
In order to avoid that individuals who are sanctioned during a certain week of a stratum
are matched to individuals who have already left UI receipt before this week, we divide
each stratum into eight weekly treatment intervals usplit and for each usplit we exclude those
from the analysis who are not at risk of being sanctioned anymore during the respective
week as their UI receipt ended before. Our estimator of interest is the di￿erence in the
labour market status over time between those who were sanctioned in stratum u and those
not having been sanctioned up to the end of u but still being in UI receipt at usplit (L >
usplit ¡1, with L being the total weeks of UI receipt and usplit ¡1 denoting the end of the
13For a number of di￿erent approaches to solve the missing start date problem see Lechner (1999a).
14There are two reasons for de￿ning a two months period as one stratum: ￿rst, a relatively short period
as observation window, reduces the potential bias due to conditioning on future outcomes described
in Fredriksson/Johansson (2004). Second, the shorter the strata are de￿ned the more precisely this
approach is able to control for the dynamic sorting process. Ideally, one would estimate daily probit
models. This is not possible due to the small number of sanctions. Instead we chose the two months
period and argue that within these two months treatment is exogenous, i.e. the exact start date of
a sanction within a stratum is not in￿uenced by the elapsed duration of UI receipt. As the absolute
numbers of sanctions per month in our sample after month six is relatively small, the empirical analysis
is restricted to three strata.
12week before usplit), i.e. being at the risk of being sanctioned during usplit. The outcomes




t as labour market status in month t if having been sanc-
tioned during stratum u and if not having been sanctioned during stratum u or before,
respectively. For each u we thus focus on a dynamic version of the average treatment e￿ect
on the treated ¢ATT
t , i.e. the e￿ect of being sanctioned in stratum u on the outcome at
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In order to use the dynamic matching approach above to create ex-post a setting that
comes closest to an experimental setting, the CIA has to be expanded by the dynamic
aspect. Accordingly we assume the dynamic version of the CIA (DCIA) to hold:
E(Y
0(u)
t jDu = 1;L > usplit ¡ 1;D1 = ::: = Du¡1 = 0;P(X))
= E(Y
0(u)
t jDu = 0;L > usplit ¡ 1;D1 = ::: = Du¡1 = 0;P(X)) (A.3)
Thus we assume that conditional on the propensity score P(X), conditional on being at
risk of being sanctioned (L > usplit ¡ 1) and conditional on not having been sanctioned
up to the beginning of the stratum considered (D1 = ::: = Du¡1 = 0), sanctioned and
non-sanctioned individuals are comparable in their outcomes (except for the realisations
of Du) during stratum u and in the months after.
5.3 Di￿erence-in-Di￿erences matching estimator
The usual matching estimators introduced so far rely on the data demanding (D)CIA.
Though we are con￿dent that our data contain the relevant information so that it is highly
plausible that this assumption is satis￿ed, as a robustness check we introduce an estimator
which is able to tackle the problem of individual speci￿c, time-invariant unobserved dif-
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Using this estimator, time-invariant individual speci￿c factors are eliminated, i.e. a bias
due to unobservables of this nature does not occur. As in our application we deal with a
binary outcome variable, the employment status, simply taking the di￿erences before and
after treatment does not seem to be a reasonable exercise. Therefore we take advantage of
the panel-like structure of our data and calculate the individual-speci￿c sum of the monthly
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u¡1 = 0); (10)
where t indicates the months after treatment as introduced above and t0 refers to the
months before the start of the UI spell. Basically, we compare the di￿erence in the sum of
the outcomes during the twelve months after treatment and before UI start of the treated
to the very di￿erence of the untreated.
5.4 Details of the matching approach
The probit models for the estimation of the propensity scores are estimated by stratum
u for men and women. Those cases who left UI receipt before less than eight days are
excluded from the analysis for two reasons: the remaining sample is expected to be less
heterogenous and second doing so we can include two important covariates about placement
propositions received during the ￿rst week. We use the linear prediction of a probit model
of the probability of being treated given observed characteristics as propensity score.15
The results presented are based on nearest neighbourhood matching with ￿ve neighbours
with replacement with a caliper of 0.005 in order to avoid extremely bad matches.16 For the
analysis of stratum two and three, we exclude those UI recipients who have been sanctioned
during one and one or two respectively from the probit estimation (see equation 6). In
order to make sure that UI recipients sanctioned by a short-term sanction were not used
as controls, we excluded those persons who have been sanctioned by a two-week sanction
during the respective stratum. Additionally we dropped those cases, where a sanction was
obviously taken back as it was shorter than seven days17.
The following matching restrictions were imposed: ￿rst a common support restriction18;
second we matched only those individuals who entered UI receipt in the same quarter
of calender time in order to align seasonal variations; third we excluded those individuals
15A linear prediction as balancing score has a higher discriminative power than the predicted probabilities
as the variances of the latter is much lower and may thus create more duplicates in terms of the
propensity score.
16Nearest neighbour matching with one, three and ￿ve neighbours without caliper and with calipers 0.010
and 0.005 and a "95th-percentile caliper" was applied. The latter was the 95th percentile of the
distribution of the di￿erence in the propensity score between treated and matched controls after a
one to one matching with replacement. Note the we use a linear prediction instead of the predicted
probability. The decision for the speci￿cation presented in this paper is based on the matching quality
indicator MSB (see section 7.2) and the number of treated lost. The results reported are sensitive to
the choice of speci￿cation.
17About 20% of sanctions fall in this category of non-e￿ective sanctions.
18The common support restriction causes observations to be dropped if their propensity score is higher
than the maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of the controls.
14from the pool of potential controls whose UI bene￿t receipt ended before the sanction start-
ing date of the potentially matched treated (usplit).19 The standard errors are estimated
according to the following formula proposed by Lechner (1999b):
V ar =




weight2 ¢ V (Y (0)jD = 0)
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Our empirical analysis is based on administrative data of the federal employment agency
(FEA).21 The key feature of these data is that they contain daily information on the
(un)employment history of every person in Germany.22 In order to build our sample we
drew 400.000 persons who entered UI receipt between 1 April 2000 and 31 March 2001 in
West Germany out of the bene￿t recipient history. These persons had to be between 18
and 55 years old when they entered UI receipt and they had to have an employment spell
within twelve weeks before they got unemployed. By the latter restriction we tried to avoid
including persons who already were sanctioned due to a voluntary quit before they entered
unemployment as we were interested in e￿ects of the ￿rst sanction. In order to build a set
of characteristics that yields the (D)CIA plausible we had to create an analysis dataset
containing a broad amount of information: of these randomly drawn persons we merged
all unemployment, employment, job seeking and ALMP program participation spells that
were found in the administrative data.23
We use three di￿erent outcomes: "regular employment", "other employment" and out of
labour force. Employment is regarded as regular if it is unsubsidised employment subject
to social contributions. "Other employment" might be subidised employment and implies
employment such as minor jobs or short term jobs. The outcomes (Y
(u)
t ) are either 1
19In order to impose the latter restriction each stratum was divided into eight weeks and eight dummies
were build indicating in which week of the stratum the treated individuals were sanctioned. In the next
step for each week only those treated were kept that were sanctioned during the respective week and
only those controls that were still in UI receipt at the beginning of the respective week were kept.
20As we use ￿ve neighbours matching, the usual sampling weight of the matched untreated is 0.2. In those
cases were only four neighbours were found, it is 0.25 etc.. If one control is used twice, the sampling
weight was e.g. 0.4.
21The micro data were drawn from the bene￿t recipient history (LeH), the integrated employment biogra-
phies (IEB) and an additional data base called ISAAK.
22Provided the employment is subject to social insurance contribution or provided the person is registerd
as unemployed or as job seeker respectively.
23For further information about the data sets used see Dundler (2006).
15if the person is in employment (or out of labour force) or 0 otherwise.24 The outcome
out of labour force is built by screening all administrative data for whether a spell was
found in a labour market state, either employed, unemployed, job seeking or in an ALMP
measure. The data used in this study do not allow us to distinguish between a sanction
due to refusing training or a sanction due to refusing work. What we do observe in the
data though is the exact date of the imposition of the sanction. Thus we can draw the
information about the month when (if at all) the UI recipient was sanctioned relative to
the start of UI receipt (D(u)).
6.2 Plausibility of the matching assumption
In order to justify the (D)CIA, we have to observe all factors that jointly in￿uence treat-
ment and our outcome of interest. The core of our argument is the richness of the available
data. According to Wilke (2004) the selection into an e￿ective sanction follows a two-step
process: ￿rst, a sanction will be mainly imposed if the UI recipients is not able to prevent
a sanction e.g. by applying for the job o￿ered in the placement proposition in such a way
that any potential employer is not interested in him. Second, as it is possible to ￿le an
objection against a sanction meaning that it might become ine￿ective, those ￿nally will
be sanctioned e￿ectively who did neither ￿le an objection or who were not successful in
doing so. We argue that the only di￿erence between the groups of sanctioned and the
non-sanctioned after matching is an exogenous incidence, e.g. the caseworker "randomly"
proposes a job vacancy where the UI recipient refuses to apply. Accordingly the matched
individuals would have reacted the same way; simply they were lucky as to not having been
o￿ered such a job vacancy.25 We base this argument on the observation of the abrupt jump
of the sanction rate in 2003 supporting the idea of exogenous variation in the individual
sanction probability (see section 3).
As the aim of the matching procedure is for each stratum u to create a sample wherein
a sanction is randomly imposed we have to control for a number of variables, namely
all variables that jointly in￿uence the probability of being sanctioned during stratum u
and the labour market status during stratum u and later. We include information on
age, on German citizenship as well as on non-European citizenship.26 In order to control
for heterogeneity regarding the quali￿cation between treated and controls we include the
following variables: the wage earned in the last job, dummies for the school education
and for training quali￿cation, as well as for quali￿cation level of the desired job as an
24In order to build Y
(u)
t , ￿rst t*30.5 days are added to the individual UI spell start and stored as t-day.
Second all employment spells found were screened whether this t-day was within the spell - if yes Y
(u)
t
was set to 1 if no, it was set to 0. In other words, only if the employment spell included the individual
reference day (t-day), it was counted as employment.
25Note that we control for the number of placement propositions received during the unemployment spell
in order to control for a potential caseworker e￿ect.
26The reference group thus is non-German Europeans.
16indicator of the assessment of quali￿cation. In order to model the UI bene￿t recipient’s
employment biography, we include the cumulated duration of contributory employment27,
of minor employment, of UI bene￿t receipt, and of UA bene￿t receipt within half a year,
one, two and three years previous to UI receipt start. We control for the average duration
of contributory jobs and the number of di￿erent ￿rms that the person had a contributory
job at, both also in sets of variables covering half a year, one year, two and three years
previous to UI start. Additionally, dummies for the industrial sector and the ￿rmsize of
the last employer as well as for the job position held in the last job are considered. The
household context is controlled for by including marital status and the age of the youngest
child as dummies for three di￿erent age groups. We control for the caseworker’s appraisal
of potential health restrictions. Using time-varying covariates we control for placement
propositions received during the UI spell: for stratum one we control for the number of
placement propositions received during the ￿rst week of the UI spell28; for stratum two we
additionally control for placement propositions received during stratum one (except those
of the ￿rst week); for stratum three placement propositions received during stratum two are
added to the probit model. In order to model the UI bene￿t recipients regional ￿exibility,
we include the expected commuting distance to the previous job. A dummy variable
indicating whether the person has been sanctioned during the 12 months before UI start
is included in order to capture heterogeneity among UI recipients in terms of ￿nancial
punishment experience. Finally, for stratum two and three we include an indicator for
whether the UI recipient holds an irregular job during the month before the considered
stratum starts.
On the regional level we control for unemployment rate and vacancy rate, each one month
before the individual UI spell starts, and we control for the caseload in the respective local
employment agency as the ratio between unemployed and caseworkers as average of the
year when the UI spell starts29 and for the sanction rate, de￿ned as in M￿ller/Oschmiansky
(2006), one month lagged to the individual UI start.30
7 Empirical results
7.1 Descriptive evidence of UI sanctions
Table 4 describes the incidences of sanctions by gender and by stratum:
We can see that though the absolute numbers of sanctions decrease by each stratum,
27I.e. employment subject to social contribution.
28Note as mentioned above, we exclude those who left UI receipt before less than eight days.
29The FEA human resource department provided us with this information.
30Note that using the sanction rate as instrumental variable would not identify the ex post e￿ect, but
a local average treatment e￿ect (LATE; Angrist/Imbens/Rubin (1996)), which would include the ex
ante e￿ect. Therefore we balance the di￿erences of local sanction rates between treated and controls
by including the sanction rate in the matching procedure.
17Table 4: Sanctions: number of incidences, number of persons at risk and sanction
probabilities





on being at risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women:
1 (1-2) 312 147199 0.21%
2 (3-4) 263 101710 0.26%
3 (5-6) 165 68935 0.24%
Men:
1 (1-2) 644 217472 0.3%
2 (3-4) 518 142945 0.36%
3 (5-6) 277 81272 0.34%
The table reports the number of sanctions due to refusal of a job or
refusal of an ALMP measure. Source: Administrative micro data of
bene￿t recipients (LeH).
the probability of getting sanctioned conditional on being at risk even increases slightly
between stratum one and two for both, men and women from 0.30% to 0.36% (men) and
0.21% to 0.26% (women). In stratum three it slightly decreases: 0.34% (men) and 0.24%
(women).
These results from the micro data support our earlier assessment: without conditioning
on any characteristics sanctions due to refusing work or an ALMP measure are rare events
during an individual UI receipt spell.
7.2 Matching quality
Table 5 presents indicators for the matching quality:31










Before After Before After
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Women:
1 11 1459 .0825 .0162 12.96 2.46
2 11 1192 .1239 .0203 14.8 3.06
3 8 738 .114 .0278 12.8 3.2
Men:
1 9 3076 .0806 .0067 14.69 1.96
2 23 2288 .1456 .0126 15.46 2.34
3 11 1241 .1097 .0189 11.55 2.26
Propensity score matching with ￿ve neighbours and replacement, common support and
a caliper of 0.005. For the formula of the meas standardised bias (MSB) see footnote
32.
Out of 2179 treated UI recipients, we lost 73 due to the common support restriction
or the caliper. McFadden’s R2 of the ￿tted probit estimations before and after matching
31In order to save space we do not include the probit estimates tables in this version
of the paper. They are available on request or in the IAB discussion paper version
(http://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2008/dp4308.pdf).
18di￿er (before: ranging from 0.0806 to 0.1456), but there is still some explanatory power
in the models after matching (ranging from 0.0067 to 0.0278; column 6). The mean stan-
dardised bias32 as indicator of the distances in the covariate distributions between treated
and controls (ranging between 11.55% and 15.46% before matching; column 7) is reduced
(ranging between 1.96% and 3.20% after matching; column 8) and is for each of these
six subsamples below 5% which is regarded as an acceptable level (cf. Caliendo/Kopeinig
(2005)). The di￿erences in the means between treated and matched controls per covariate
are all insigni￿cant at a 5%-level.33
7.3 Ex-post e￿ects
We will ￿rst discuss the results of the monthly ¢ATT
t estimates and second the ¢ATT
DiD
estimates as a robustness check. Additionally to ¢ATT
DiD, in the appendix we provide ¢ATT
Sum
estimates, where the outcome is the number of months in employment and out of labour
force respectively during a twelve-month period after the stratum considered.
Figures 1-6 in the appendix report graphically on the e￿ect of a UI sanction for the
months after the sanction has been imposed:
For men and women separately and for each outcome used, a group of three graph-
ics is presented: per stratum a graph of the monthly di￿erences in the outcome before
treatment34 and the monthly ¢ATT
t . The time axis represents the months from twelve
months before UI receipt start until 18 months after the end of the stratum considered,
the time axis is presented relative to the start of the UI spell (=0). Two vertical lines shall
help to distinguish between the months before (left hand side line) and after the stratum
considered (right hand side line).
For women being sanctioned in stratum one or two (signi￿cantly) raises the probability
of being regularly employed in the months after the stratum considered. The signi￿cant
e￿ects range between 5 and 10 %-points. Regarding the outcome "other employment" the
monthly ¢ATT
t estimates suggest an ex post e￿ect for stratum one and two with a time
lag. The signi￿cant e￿ects on "other employment" are smaller (around 5 %-points). For
the outcome out of labour force we hardly ￿nd empirical evidence for women in terms of






j ¹ Xk1t ¡ ¹ Xk0t j
p
0:5 ¢ (Vk1t(X) + Vk0t(X))
with K denoting the number of variables and ¹ X1 (V1) denoting the mean
(variance) in the treated group and ¹ X0 (V0) the mean (variance) in the comparison group before match-
ing if t = 0, and the corresponding moments after matching if t = 1 (cf. Caliendo/Hujer/Thomsen
(2005)).
33In order to save space we do not include the matching indicators per covariate in this ver-
sion of the paper. They are available on request or in the IAB discussion paper version
(http://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2008/dp4308.pdf).
34We present the di￿erence in the outcome before treatment in order to check graphically the quality of
the matches.
19monthly e￿ects.35
For men we observe a rise in the probability of being regularly employed immediately
after each stratum considered. For stratum one and two the monthly e￿ects on the outcome
"other employment" are mostly negative. For men we ￿nd positive e￿ects on the outcome
out of labour force for several months after the sanction.
In sum, both, men and women seem to respond to a sanction in terms of being regularily
employed after a sanction during stratum one or two. Regarding the outcome "other
employment", we ￿nd gender di￿erences: while women in general are more likely to be in
"other employment" due to the sanction, the opposite is the case for men.
The graphical evidence is supported when looking at the ¢ATT
DiD estimates (being the
di￿erence in the number of months after the stratum considered and before UI start during
a 12 month period) in table 6:
Table 6: ¢ATT
D iD and ¢ATT



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women: Men:
¢ATT
sum : 1 (1-2) .67** .28* .26 .58*** -.13* .21
2 (3-4) .72** .51** .16 .78*** -.15* .53***
3 (5-6) .33 .26 .16 .39 .07 .48**
¢ATT
DiD: 1 (1-2) .66* .27 .35 .6** -.11* .23
2 (3-4) .85** .6** .31 .8*** -.15* .64***
3 (5-6) .21 .28 .17 .42 .05 .47*
Note: Results of regression in matched sample with only treatment indicator as regressor and weights attached to controls.
Robust standard errors. Signi￿cance levels: *: 10% ; **: 5% ; ***: 1% ; Dependent variables: ¢ATT
sum : Number of months in
employment during 12 months after stratum, and respectively months 4-15 after (out of labour market); ¢ATT
DiD Dependent
variable of ¢ATT
sum minus number of months in employment during 12 months before UI start.
Focussing on the signi￿cant e￿ects only, we ￿nd that for both, women and men, a
sanction during stratum one or two raises the number of months of "regular employment"
during the twelve month period after the stratum considered (women: 0.66, 0.85, men: 0.60,
0.80). For women being sanctioned during stratum two we additionally ￿nd a signi￿cant
positive e￿ect on the number of months of "other employment" (0.6).36 For men being
sanctioned during stratum one the negative e￿ect on "other employment" is even signi￿cant
at a 10-%-level (-0.11, -0.15) and those men being sanctioned during stratum two or three
are more likely to be out of the labour force.37
35As being sanctioned will systematically lead to a disappearance from the administrative data for the
duration of the sanction, regarding the outcome out of labour force the monthly e￿ects should be
interpret only after months three after the end of the stratum.
36For the ¢ATT
DiD and the ¢ATT
Sum estimates the twelve months starting from the fourth month after the
stratum considered are counted (see comment above).
37Note that never di￿ering in terms of their sign, the ¢ATT
Sum estimates only di￿er slightly in size (and
207.4 Ex-post e￿ects - Evidence from subgroups
We used the same estimation procedure described above, starting from separate probit
models for each subgroup considered. We do not report the monthly ¢ATT
t estimates but
only the ¢ATT
DiD estimates. We divide our sample into UI recipients below 30 years and
above 29 years. Second, we analyse the subgroups of those being unemployed in a region
with lower and respectively higher unemployment rates.38
As the number of treated within the subgroups are quite small for stratum three, we
only report on the results of the ￿rst two strata. The matching quality indicators of the
subgroup estimates indicate that the matching quality naturally su￿ers a bit by dividing
the sample as the pools of potential controls are diminished.39 Out of the 16 subsamples,
only of two the MSB after matching is below a value of 3% and of two it is even higher than
5% (5.01 and 5.53). Table 7 in the appendix reports on the ¢ATT
DiD estimate per subgroup,
stratum and for men and women:40
Table 7: ¢ToTATT

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women: Men:
age 18-29 ¢ATT
sum : 1 .79* .09 -.21 .54** -.09 .12
2 1.38*** .21 -.21 .95*** -.11 .41*
age 30-55 1 .3 .55** .35 .31 -.28** .35*
2 .11 .59 .49 .58* -.12 .42*
Local unemployment rate low 1 .85** -.02 .32 -.12 .06 .74***
2 .69 .57 .16 .97*** -.15 .16
Local unemployment rate high 1 .06 .59** -.15 .83*** -.34*** -.07
2 .51 .06 -.01 .44 -.08 .73***
age 18-29 ¢ATT
DiD : 1 .73 .15 -.1 .58* -.07 .17
2 1.32** .37 -.37 .98** -.12 .51*
age 30-55 1 .48 .55* .3 .32 -.29** .38*
2 .19 .56 .59* .55 -.08 .56**
Local unemployment rate low 1 1.03** .07 .32 .04 .06 .75***
2 .72 .96** .28 1.08*** -.17 .2
Local unemployment rate high 1 -.24 .78** -.16 .82** -.33*** -.04
2 .67 .08 .02 .61 * -.09 .81***
Note: Results of regression in matched sample with only treatment indicator as regressor and weights attached to controls. Robust standard
errors. Signi￿cance levels: *: 10% ; **: 5% ; ***: 1% ; Dependent variables: ¢ATT
sum : Number of months in employment during 12 months
after stratum, and respectively months 4-15 after (out of labour market); ¢ATT
DiD : Dependent variable of ¢ATT
sum minus number of months in
employment during 12 months before UI start.
Our results suggest that for women the e￿ects on "regular employment" found for the ￿rst
stratum are indeed driven by young women, while older women seem to be more responsive
in terms of "other employment". Also the positive (though insigni￿cant) e￿ect found for the
signi￿cance). This ￿nding supports the matching quality indicators which suggest good matching
quality.
38We take the median to split the sample.
39In order to save space we do not include the matching quality indicators for the subgroups in
this version of the paper. They are available on request or in the IAB discussion paper version
(http://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2008/dp4308.pdf).
40In order to save space the probit coe￿cient tables of the subgroup analysis are not included in this
paper.
21outcome out of labour force is driven by older women (while for the younger group though
not being signi￿cant they are even negative). For men it is also the subsample of younger
UI recipients that is more responsive to the ￿nancial incentive of a sanction regarding the
number of months in "regular employment" afterwards. Regarding the outcomes "other
employment" and out of labour force both male age groups seem to react in a similar way.
The latter result might be a hint that a sanction causes an increase in the probability to
work in the shadow economy.
Dividing the sample by the regional unemployment rate we ￿nd that for the outcome
"regular employment" especially for women in better o￿ regions sanctions have an e￿ect
(1.03, .72). For men on the other hand being sanctioned during stratum one in a worse
o￿ region is much more e￿ective (0.82) than in better o￿ regions (0.04). This seems to be
an interesting ￿nding as to one might ask whether the e￿ectiveness of sanctions does not
only depend on the individual reaction but also depend on the labour market conditions.
Women in worse o￿ regions being sanctioned in stratum one on the other hand respond to
a sanction by taking up "other employment". The signi￿cant negative e￿ect of a sanction
during stratum one on the outcome "other employment" for men seems to be driven by
the subgroup living in worse o￿ regions (-0.33).
In sum, for men and women we ￿nd that the e￿ect of a sanction on the months in
"regular employment" is driven by the younger UI recipients. The results regarding the
subgroups de￿ned by the local unemployment rate appear somewhat erratic.
8 Conclusion and outlook
In this paper we use administrative data in order to evaluate the ex post e￿ect of sanctions
due to refusing work or an active labour market policy (ALMP) measure for a sample of
individuals who entered unemployment insurance (UI) bene￿t receipt in West Germany
during April 2000 and March 2001. We identify the ex post e￿ect using a matching approach
that takes timing of the treatment explicitly into account: we model the e￿ects of a sanction
imposed during either of three strata consisting each of two months on the employment
probability in each out of twelve months after the end of the stratum considered. As a
robustness check we introduce a di￿erence-in-di￿erences matching estimator. A potential
in￿uence of unobserved time-invariant characteristics is eliminated thereby. In order to
avoid biases due to time-varying characteristics we include potentially confounding factors,
namely variables on whether a person took up an irregular job and the number of placement
propositions he or she received during the pre-treatment UI period and are con￿dent that
the identifying assumption holds. In order to give some insights into di￿erent subgroups we
￿nally distinguish the sample by age and by local labour market conditions. The outcome
states we consider are holding a regular job, holding an irregular job and being out of the
labour force.
22This study is based on a sample which was faced with a sanction regulation framework
di￿erent to the one existing today. Compared to the currently e￿ective regulation, where
the ￿rst sanction imposed due to refusing a training or an active labour market policy
(ALMP) measure is a 100% bene￿t reduction lasting for three weeks only, in 2000/2001
a UI bene￿t sanction implied a 100% bene￿t reduction for twelve weeks. We suppose
that this is part of the reason why the numbers of incidences and the sanction probability
respectively were extremely low during our observation period.
For both, men and women, we ￿nd evidence of an average ex post e￿ect of a UI sanction
during stratum one or two on the "regular employment" probability. These e￿ects are
mainly driven by young UI recipients. Regarding the outcome "other employment" the
results are ambigous: for women they are positive, but negative for men. Taking the
subgroups into account, we ￿nd that the positive e￿ect on "other employment" for women
results from the older subgroup while the negative e￿ect for men (for stratum one) is found
largest in regions with relatively higher unemployment rates. With respect to the outcome
out of labour force, especially older women seem to respond to sanctions, while among men
especially those having been sanctioned during stratum two or three withdraw from the
labour market.
The di￿erences in the e￿ects between the three di￿erent strata considered might partly
be traced back to a dynamic sorting process, i.e. it is di￿erent types of persons a) who are
at risk of being sanctioned and b) who are sanctioned during stratum three compared to
the ￿rst two strata.
The results are in line with the empirical literature on ex post e￿ects of unemployment
bene￿t sanctions summarized in section 2: on average a sanction has a positive e￿ect on
the employment outcome. As we saw in section 4, job search theory suggests the causal
mechanism to work via a decrease in the reservation wage and an increase in the search
intensity. Both might a￿ect the quality of post-unemployment jobs. Though the estimation
framework used in this paper gives some hints about the stability of the employment
taken up after a sanction, future research should investigate the e￿ects of unemployment
bene￿t sanctions on the quality (e.g. in terms of wages and quali￿cational level) and the
sustainability of post-unemployment jobs (e.g. analysing the job duration of the ￿rst job
after a sanction).
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